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ARGUMENT
L

THE LDA SHOULD NOT BE THE "EXCLUSIVE SOURCE" FROM WHICH
THE INDIGENT LEGAL DEFENSE, INCLUDING DEFENSE RESOURCES,
MAY BE PROVIDED
At the outset, Appellant ("Jeffs") adopts and incorporates hereat the arguments made

in the Reply Brief of Anthony Davis, since his arguments are equally applicable to Jeffs,
especially as such pertain to the Association of Counties Amicus Brief.
At the hearing on Jeffs' Motion to Declare Defendant Indigent and to Provide an
Investigator and Expert Witness at State Expense, the trial court ruled that defendant would
never be entitled to defense resources because he could not show "compelling reasons". Yet,
Jeffs' need for defense resources is as compelling as any other similarly situated indigent
defendant represented by the LDA. He requested a private investigator, a ballistics expert,
and a medical expert. A defendant represented by LDA would have these "resources"
provided him.
As stated by appellee, if the Utah Indigent Defense Act (Act) is the exclusive source from
which the indigent legal defense, including defense resources, may be provided, unless the court after
proper notice and hearingfindsa compelling reason for the appointment of a noncontracting attorney
or defense resource and no compelling reasons are recognized by the trial court, then the Act is
unconstitutional. If the Act is applied by the trial courts in such a way to favor indigent defendants
represented by the LDA over those who are not so represented by are indigent, then the application
is unconstitutional. Those indigent defendants who were lucky enough to not afford an attorney will
be provided legal representation through the LDA and receive all defense resources necessary.
-1-

Those indigent defendants who were unlucky enough to initially hire private counsel will be treated
in a disparate manner - they will not qualify for defense resources. Completely ignored by
appellee (and the Association of Counties in its amicus brief) is the Utah Supreme Court case
filed subsequently to the amendment of the Act: State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, 144 P.3d
1152 (2006) which cited with approval State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56 flf 9: "Relevant to this
case, the Act requires that a local government "provide [an indigent defendant with] the
investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense."J.1 Carreno also cited Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77, 105 S.CT. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) ["For counsel to be
effective in the case of an indigent defendant, the state must provide a defendant with access
to "the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense." Id at % 9.]
Also overlooked by appellee and AOC is the language in Burns (citing Britt v. North
Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,227, 92 S.CT. 431,30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971)) dealing with denials of
equal protection: [f,(T)he Court in Britt v. North Carolina held that as a matter of equal
protection, a state must 'provide indigent prisoners with the basic tools of an adequate
defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a price to other prisoners.' 404 U.S. 226,

1

Salt Lake County's, during its brief to the trial court and brief filed with this Court,
only argument against the application of State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795 is that it
predated the amendments to the Act and that the Act "overturned" Burns even though
appellee and AOC never cited this Court to any portion of the Act or its legislative history
as authority therefor. Moreover, the legislative history, as set forth Subsection II, including
fn 2, Appellant's Initial Brief, clearly demonstrates that the Utah Senate never intended to
"overturn" Burns. Furthermore, neither appellee or AOC mentioned State v. Carreno, its
applicability to the present case and the fact that it was decided after the amendment to the
Act.
-2-

227, 92 S.CT. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76-77,
105 S.CT. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (holding that to provide effective defense, indigent
defendants must have access to basic tools of defense)11.]
No amount of posturing over budgets or county policies can trump the fact that
indigent defendants "must have access to basic tools of defense11 when similarly situated
indigent defendants represented by the LDA have such access to basic tools of defense.2
In accord, Britt, supra, ["It is equally evident that if a defendant is denied access to the
basic tools of an adequate defense, then he has also been denied his due process right of a fair trial."]
n.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO
"COMPELLING REASON" WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY AUTHORIZING OR
DESIGNATING A NONCONTRACTING ATTORNEY FOR DEFENSE
RESOURCE
The trial court relied exclusively on the three compelling circumstances set forth in

§ 77-32-201(2), U.C.A. However, that portion of the Act states that these reasons are not
exclusive. A compelling reason ignored by the trial court was that Jeffs retained the private
counsel of choice and should not be penalized for such retention by having defense resources
being denied him because his private attorney did not have a contract with the county. Bear

2

This argument may beg the question of a defendant's right to be represented by the
attorney of his choice, which issue and argument were presented in Jeffs1 Initial Brief,
Argument I. Moreover, appellee, in its response brief, Argument/Issue IV, agreed that the
Act does not require a defendant to terminate his private counsel in order to seek county-paid
defense resources. However, it seems to Jeffs that in order to do so, he must first show a
compelling reason, an impossible burden in his case. That means the appellee's interpretation
of the Act is unconstitutional. See Argument/Issue I, Jeffs' Initial Brief, enunciating Jeffs'
right to be represented by the counsel of his choice.
-3-

in mind that Jeffs has never requested any fees for his attorney. He is seeking only defense
resources, to wit: providing 1) a private investigator; 2) a ballistic expert; and 3) a medical
expert to testify regarding issues of diminished capacity as outlined in the Initial Brief The
fact that he had already paid for a defense attorney and then became indigent due to his
protracted incarceration awaiting trial, that because of his indigency, he was unable to pay
for these three defense resources. This should have constituted the "compelling reason".
Otherwise, there would be a denial of equal protection. Legal assistance and defense
resources are two separate but inherent elements of a state's constitutional obligation to
indigent criminal defendants.
What was not addressed by appellee in its response brief was Jeffs' argument that the
LDA has not contracted with any defense resources and/or expert assistance, even though
required by the Act. The county has no contract with the experts requested by Jeffs, LDA
has no such contract, nor does Salt Lake County have a contract with LDA to provide such,
specifically by name and field of expertise. As part of its memorandum opposing Jeffs'
request for these defense resources, Salt Lake County provided a copy of its contract with
the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association (R. 157-174). As a consequence, the County is
without the protections offered in § 302 or § 303 and is therefor subject to the full burden
imposed by Due Process and § 301 of the Act. Appellee's failure to address this compelling
issue demonstrates the truth of Jeffs' assertions.
III.

THE AMENDED ACT DOES NOT "OVERTURN" OR "SUPERSEDE"
BURNS
-4-

Compared to the legislative history set forth in Jeffs' Initial Brief, § II, the legislative
history elucidated by appellee is not complete. Moreover, appellee has taken liberties with
very plain language from a debate excerpt. Moreover, without any authority whatsoever,
appellee makes the flawed statement that f,[t]he Utah legislature sought to overturn Burns by
enacting S.B. 154 in 2001". Its cite to Representative Curtis1 February 26, 2001 statement
says nothing about "overturning" Burns. This statement only uses the term "deals" not
overturns. The term deals has many meanings. But, specifically, the word "overturns" is not
to be found in the legislative history.
Moreover, the standard in Burns is fully applicable today: a finding of indigency and
proof of necessity. Burns also cited Rule 15, U.R.Crim.P., as further support for its holding:
"Furthermore, rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[u]pon
showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose services are
necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were called on behalf
of the prosecution." Utah R.Crim. P. 15(a). (Footnotes omitted.) This rule has not been
amended subsequent to the 2001 Act.
Furthermore, as stated above and not addressed by appellee or any amicus briefs, this
very Court affirmed Burns in 2006, five years after the amendment to the Act in Carreno.
Far from attempting to overturn Burns, the Act explicitly acknowledges Burns, not
by name but by reference, and provides a means whereby if the counties and cities comply
with the plain language of the statute, they would have some measure of fiscal protection
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from the seemingly unlimited obligation imposed on them by Due Process, Equal Protection,
and §§77-32-301 and 302(1).
It appears that in reality, there is no conflict between Burns and the Act. State v.
Burns merely articulated the two duties inherent to the right of Due Process (and Equal
Protection) that were endorsed and codified by the legislature, which also provided a
simple-to-comply-with scheme permitting the counties to exert some degree of reasonable
control over the otherwise limitless potential costs of fulfilling their duties.
Burns is entirely consistent with the 14th amendment's requirements of equal
protection and due process and With Ake and Britt. If that is "obscure logic", then it appears
the Constitution and interpretive cases are also using obscure logic to ensure that
constitutional guarantees are in place in spite of appellee's interpretation of the Act.
IV.

IN REALITY, APPELLEE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT WOULD
REQUIRE JEFFS TO TERMINATE HIS PRIVATE COUNSEL IN ORDER
TO BE ENTITLED TO DEFENSE RESOURCES
As stated hereinabove, the trial court found that there were no compelling reasons

justifying Jeffs' entitlement to defense resources (specifically finding that the retention of
Jeffs' private counsel was not a compelling reason to entitle him to defense resources).
Appellee's brief buttresses this and makes clear that under the context of this case, if Jeffs
were to receive defense resources, he could only do it through the LDA, which are the
exclusive source to provide legal defense. Again, that means he would have to terminate the
services of his private counsel to obtain these resources. It is double speak for the county to
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make this argument. The bottom line is that Jeffs, under its reasoning, would not be able to
retain the attorney of his choice. As such, the county's interpretation of the Act is
unconstitutional. Part and parcel of defendant's 6th amendment right is the right to choice
of counsel. See U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006), 126 S.Ct. 2557 ["In sum, the
right at stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right
was violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous. No additional showing of
prejudice is required to make the violation 'complete.1'5 "The right to select counsel of one's
choice, by contrast, has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment's purpose of ensuring
a fair trial. It has been regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional guarantee."] The
U.S. Supreme Court then stated:
Deprivation of the right is "complete" when the defendant is erroneously
prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the
quality of the representation he received. To argue otherwise is to confuse the
right to counsel of choice—which is the right to a particular lawyer regardless
of comparative effectiveness — with the right to effective counsel — which
imposes a baseline requirement of competence on whatever lawyer is chosen
or appointed.
Id. at 148.
In accord, State v. Schoonmaker, 143 N.M. 373,176 P.3d 1105 (2008) ["We note that
most states that have interpreted their indigent defense statutes in similar cases have held that
indigent defendants are not required to be represented by the public defender in order to
receive state funding for ancillary services that comprise 'the basic tools of an adequate
defense.' (Citing Burns with approval.)]
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In accord, United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619,625 (10th Cir. 1990) ["Attorneys are
not fungible; often, the most important decision a defendant make in shaping his defense is
his selection of an attorney"], superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Lewis
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 523 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir.2008).
This above is applicable to the argument of the AOC, Part II, Amicus Brief dealing
with defendants being required to fire their private counsel in order to qualify for defense
resources. Such is unconstitutional since defendants have the right to the counsel of their
choice.
Nowhere in the AOC's amicus brief and appellee's brief is compelling reasons defined
other than the three enumerated reasons in the Act which are not to be exclusive. In other
words, defendants are stuck with trying to show their compelling reasons are one of these
three. None of these three reasons has to do with their private counsel.
The examples listed by the AOC deal with budget matters. If AOC is so concerned
about costs, its clients should more carefully screen who it charges. The arguments of AOC,
distilled to their essence, are that the budget concerns of states and counties should be
allowed to trump the constitutional rights of defendants, that equal protection be ignored, and
a defendant's right to the counsel of his choice be taken from him. AOC is espousing that
a defendant with a privately retained attorney who later becomes indigent should not be
afforded the same defense resources as an indigent defendant represented by LDA.
In the instant case, Jeffs, at the beginning of his incarceration, he had the funds to hire
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private counsel. However, he has now been incarcerated since May, 2008 and has lost
everything. He is penniless. His protracted incarceration is what has made it impossible for
him to be able to pay for defense resources. His retained counsel is familiar with his case.
The effect of AOC's argument would now increase the financial burden on Salt Lake County
to have the LDA take over and provide the defense resources required for a complete defense
and get up to speed on the case. But, this course is not without constitutional consequences
- Jeffs would be denied having the counsel of his choice. In other words, he would be
required to give up one right in order to avoid the loss of another right - the right of equal
protection.
V.

THE PRO BONO CLAIM IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
TO DEMONSTRATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF APPELLEE'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT AND SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
This is not an appeal as a matter of right and Jeffs was not required to and did not

exhaust every argument. Moreover, the State's attempt to excise this issue from the matter
pending before this Court is based upon a policy argument. Unlike State v. Shaffer, 210 UT
App 240, \ 10, 239 P.3d 285, 288, this is an interlocutory appeal over one issue: Whether
Burns is still good law. This appeal does not involve a full and complete case from
beginning to end, where a plain error argument could be made if an adequate record was not
kept. Again, this case is not a review of the record, it is only to determine the issue regarding
Burns. Consequently, this portion of appellee's brief should be unheeded.
The pro bono issue in Jeffs' initial brief was placed there to show the consequences
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of appellee's interpretation of the Act, which could lead to serious problems for the pro bono
program sponsored by the Utah State Bar and endorsed by this Court. This is a serious
matter that should be considered by this Court.
CONCLUSION
If the LDA is the exclusive source from which the indigent legal defsnse, including
defense resources may be provided, unless a compelling reason is found otherwise, the Act
would be unconstitutional. The trial court found that because Jeffs could not articulate a
compelling reason of the listed three in the Act, he was not entitled to defense resources. The
compelling reason was that he had private counsel and was indigent, unable to afford defense
resources. This interpretation flies in the face of equal protection and right to counsel of
one's choosing, as such constitutional principles were set forth in Burns. The bottom line is
that budget matters of a county trump the constitutional rights of a defendant.
Another case completely ignored by appellee and those submitting amicus briefs is
State v. Carreno, supra, five years post-Act which continued to uphold Burns. Again, this
Court should uphold Burns based upon this and other precedent.
Jeffs seeks a ruling reaffirming this Court's holding in Burns, that the right to legal
counsel and the right to defense resources are two distinct, constitutionally mandated rights
of indigent defendants. Further, this Court should order that unless a defendant waives his
right to both counsel and defense resources affirmatively and on the record, his waiver of one
of these rights can not be construed as a waiver of the other. Finally, Jeffs respectfully
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requests that this Court hold that the Trial Court's denial of his motion for defense resources
was erroneous and should be reversed, with a remand to the District Court with instructions
to order Salt Lake County to provide Jeffs with the defense resources necessary to prepare
his defense, as requested by him in his motions.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of January, 2011.
DAVID DRAKE, P.C.
Attorney for Appellant, Randy Fetch Jeffs
)QJJU
David Drake
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